Competition in Law Enforcement and Capital Allocation by Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain
ISSN 1183-1057 
 
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
 











Competition in Law 
Enforcement and Capital 
Allocation  
 
















   Economics 
 
 Competition in Law Enforcement and Capital Allocation?
Nicolas Marceau
Universit´ e du Qu´ ebec ` a Montr´ eal and CIRP´ EE
Steeve Mongrain




? We have beneﬁted from our discussions with Nicolas Boccard and Michael Smart, and from the comments of
Lawrence Martin and Albrecht Morgenstern. Useful comments were also received from seminar participants at
Brock University, Federal Reserve Bank in Cleveland, International Institute of Public Finance, Queen’s University,
University of Barcelona, University of Girona, and ZEI Workshop on Federalism and Decentralization. Financial
support from FQRSC, RIIM, and SSHRCC is gratefully acknowledged. Errors are our own.Abstract: This paper studies interjurisdictional competition in the ﬁght against crime and its
impact on occupational choice and the allocation of capital. In a world where capital is mobile,
jurisdictions are inhabited by individuals who choose to become workers or criminals. Because the
return of the two occupations depends on capital, and because investment in capital in a jurisdic-
tion depends on its crime rate, there is a bi-directional relationship between capital investment and
crime which may lead to capital concentration. By investing in costly law enforcement, a jurisdic-
tion makes the choice to become criminal less attractive, which reduces the number of criminals
and makes its territory more secure. This increased security increases the attractiveness of the
jurisdiction for investors and this can eventually translate into more capital being invested. We
characterize the Nash equilibria — some entailing a symmetric outcome, others an asymmetric one
— and study their eﬃciency.
Keywords: Crime; Occupational Choice; Capital Location; Law Enforcement
JEL Classiﬁcation: K421. Introduction
Security matters when it comes to investment decisions. Indeed, capital owners prefer to invest
where crime rates are low because in such places, the likelihood that they will be deprived of the
return on their investment is lower.1 Local authorities, responding to those preferences, invest in
crime deterrence. In this context, adjacent jurisdictions may compete in law enforcement, to lower
their respective crime rates and to make their jurisdiction relatively safer than others for investors.
Understanding the mechanics of such competition and the choice of law enforcement chosen by
adjacent jurisdictions is the focus of this paper.
In the United States, there are many cases of “twin” cities, with similar characteristics, which
nevertheless exhibit very diﬀerent crime rates. For example, the crime rate against properties is
60% higher in Minneapolis than in St-Paul, 100% higher in Tampa than in St Petersburg, and
46% higher in Oakland than in San Francisco.2 In the literature, there are potential explanations
for those diﬀerences in crime rates and for the concentration of criminal activities. For exam-
ple, Freeman, Grogger and Sonstelie (1996) suggest that congestion in enforcement can explain
these phenomena: Because of the technology of enforcement, more criminals translate into a lower
probability of capture, which makes criminality a more attractive choice, and therefore leads to
the concentration of crime. Zenou (2003) on the other hand, argues that social interactions could
explain the concentration of crime: With social interactions, the choice of a criminal life is more
attractive the larger the proportion of criminals in the community, so more individuals choose
to become criminals in such a case, implying that the community then experiences a high con-
centration of crime. In another paper, Verdier and Zenou (2004) explains the concentration of
1 Besley (1995) provides direct empirical evidence conﬁrming that security matters using micro-data on
investment in Ghana. More indirect evidence is found in a number of studies showing that in a given
neighbourhood, residential property values are negatively aﬀected by higher crime rates. For example,
Schwartz et al. (2003, p.102) conclude that “falling crime rates are responsible for six percentage points
of the overall 17.5 percent increase in property values that New York City experienced from 1994 to
1998.” Similarly, Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) found that property values in a given neighbourhood
are negatively aﬀected by the presence of a rail station with a parking because such stations make it
easy for criminals to access the neighbourhood.
2 Other examples of “twin” cities that exhibit very diﬀerent property crime rates include Kansas City
(Missouri) and Kansas City (Kansas), East St-Louis (Illinois) and St-Louis (Missouri), or Los Angeles
and Anaheim.
1criminal activity within a group of the population by building a model with endogenous wages and
racial discrimination. Discrimination against a group implies lower wages, which makes honest
work less attractive and crime more attractive, so that more individuals of that group become
criminals and are, eventually, discriminated against. Albeit interesting, these papers abstract from
the interaction between crime, enforcement, capital location, and wages, which is the focus of our
paper.
In fact, when security levels diﬀer, capital owners will invest in diﬀerent amounts in diﬀerent
jurisdictions. In other words, it is possible that when crime becomes more concentrated, capital
also becomes more concentrated, although obviously in diﬀerent locations. Further, an important
feature of our analysis is that individuals make the occupational choice of becoming workers or
criminals.3 For an individual, this occupational choice largely depends on the amount of capital —
a complement in production — in the jurisdiction in which he resides: more capital increases the
wage a worker can earn, but more capital also translates into a higher reward for criminal activities;
and since investment in capital in a jurisdiction depends on the crime rate in that jurisdiction, there
is a complex bi-directional relationship between capital investment and crime. We demonstrate this
by adding occupational choice to the otherwise classic problem of capital location, we can create
agglomeration eﬀects, both for crime and capital. Note that as in the case of the concentration of
crime, the reasons underlying the concentration of capital are still debated in the literature.4
The key mechanism we highlight in our analysis can be explained as follows. In standard models
without occupational choice and in which capital must be allocated between competing jurisdictions
(or uses), the unit return of capital in a given jurisdiction is a decreasing function of the stock of
capital located in it. With occupational choice, it is not necessarily so because an extra unit of
capital may lead to more individuals choosing to become workers (rather than criminals), and this
in turn can make capital more productive. It follows that if an extra unit of capital suﬃciently
3 The interaction between crime and occupational choice has been examined in a number of papers, e.g.
Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1993), Acemoglu (1995), Baland and Francois (2000), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et
al. (2000), and Lloyd-Ellis and Marceau (2003). However, none of those papers account for capital
investment and inter–jurisdictional competition.
4 For example, Glaeser et al. (1992) argue that knowledge spillover can explain the rise of large cities.
However, their argument is less compelling when it comes to understanding the variation of capital
and crime within a city.
2increases the number of workers (and decreases the number of criminals), then the unit return of
capital may be an increasing function of the stock of capital located in a jurisdiction. Of course,
whether the unit return of capital is an increasing or a decreasing function of capital aﬀects the
allocation of capital in an important way. Intuitively, if the unit return declines with the stock
of capital, then capital will tend to be equally distributed between jurisdictions. On the other
hand, if the unit return of capital increases with the stock of capital, then capitalists will ﬁnd it
advantageous to concentrate their capital in a single jurisdiction.
The nature of the law enforcement game between jurisdictions is also very diﬀerent depending on
whether the per unit return of capital a decreasing or an increasing function of the investment.
The equilibria we characterize are symmetric but they can result in very diﬀerent outcomes for ex
ante identical jurisdictions. For the case of increasing per unit return on capital, we show that all
the capital locates in the same jurisdiction, and this jurisdiction experiences low criminality, high
output and a large working population, while the other jurisdiction attracts no capital, experiences
high criminality and very low outputs.
Since Becker’s (1968) seminal work on law enforcement, few economists have paid attention to the
multi-jurisdictional nature of crime deterrence.5 This may explain why economists have a limited
understanding of the impact of law enforcement policies on criminal activities. In this paper,
we explicitly account for the multi-jurisdictional nature of the interaction between criminals and
governments and show it has important consequences. In a world without agglomeration eﬀects,
Marceau (1997) characterizes equilibria in which crime and capital are evenly distributed across
jurisdictions — a non-realistic feature. In this context, he demonstrates that the “laissez-faire”
equilibrium features a level of law enforcement greater than the socially eﬃcient level. In this
paper, by introducing occupational choice and by analyzing (symmetric) equilibria which result in
asymmetric outcomes, we show that under deterrence is possible. We are able to show that the
equilibria of the law enforcement game are generally ineﬃcient, i.e. that the levels of enforcement
chosen by the jurisdictions when they act independently diﬀers from that which would be selected
by a central authority maximizing the sum of the welfare of the two jurisdictions. Of course, since
5 While much of the literature has focused on capital tax competition between jurisdictions –see the
survey by Wilson (1999)–, the literature on competition in crime deterrence is extremely limited. An
exception is Marceau (1997).
3enforcement is ineﬃcient, so is occupational choice within each jurisdiction.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a model with mobile capital and
occupational choice. Private sector behaviour is described in Section 3 and the enforcement policies
chosen independently by the jurisdictions are characterized in Section 4. We conclude in Section
5. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We examine the problem of competition in law enforcement when capital is mobile. Each juris-
diction is inhabited by a group of immobile individuals who have to choose between becoming
workers or criminals. By investing in costly law enforcement, a jurisdiction makes the choice of
becoming a criminal less attractive, which reduces the number of criminals and makes its territory
more secure. This increased security increases the attractiveness of the jurisdiction for investors
and can eventually translate into more capital being invested.
There are two jurisdictions, a and b. Each jurisdiction i ∈ {a,b} is inhabited by a group of
individuals who collectively own an aggregate production function F(Li,Ki), where Li and Ki are
the labour force and the capital in place in Jurisdiction i, respectively. The properties of F are
standard: for the relevant range of (Li,Ki), FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0, FLL < 0, and FLK ≥ 0,
where Fh = ∂F(Li,Ki)/∂h and Fhj = ∂2F(Li,Ki)/∂h∂j.
In each jurisdiction, the population consists of a continuum of agents of measure 1, who each
chooses to become a worker or a criminal. If Li is the number of workers in Jurisdiction i, then
the number of criminals in this jurisdiction is Ci = 1 −Li.6 An individual who chooses to become
a criminal appropriates for himself some of the total return on capital. Denoted by α(di) is the
proportion of the total return on the capital a criminal is able to steal. The proportion α(di) is
a decreasing function of the level of law enforcement di chosen by the government of Jurisdiction
i. Thus, an agent who decides to become a criminal obtains α(di)KiFK(Li,Ki). Alternatively,
if he chooses to become a worker, he is paid according to the marginal product of labour, which
6 In reality, few individuals specialize solely in criminal activities. For a discussion on this topic, see
Blumstein et al. (1986). However, to keep our model as simple as possible, we decided to assume that
agents choose one of the two activities, as in Murphy et al. (1993).
4amounts to a payoﬀ given by FL(Li,Ki).
A large number of atomistic capitalists endowed with a total of ¯ K units of mobile capital choose to
allocate their capital between the two jurisdictions. The amount of capital invested in Jurisdiction
a is denoted Ka
m, and Kb
m = ¯ K − Ka
m is that invested in Jurisdiction b. Capital is allocated by
the owners after the choice of law enforcement by each government. The governments are assumed
to be committed to their enforcement policy. Once capital is allocated, it becomes completely
immobile. We also assume that in each of the two jurisdictions, some immobile capital is already
in place. Denoted by Ki
o is the amount of capital already in place in Jurisdiction i. Without loss
of generality, we assume that Ka
o ≥ Kb
o ≥ 0.
In Jurisdiction i, the government chooses the level of law enforcement, di, which it can buy at a
cost of 1 per unit. As was mentioned above, a larger di negatively aﬀects the proportion α(di)
that is stolen by each criminal, i.e. α0(di) < 0. The proportion α(di) is assumed to belong to
the interval [0, ¯ α], where ¯ α is the maximum proportion that can be appropriated. Even in the
absence of public enforcement, there are constraints on such a proportion. Private enforcement,
which we do not consider in this paper, is a good example. We assume that governments ﬁnance
their expenditures by use of a pure lump sum tax.
The objective function of the governments could take many forms. For example, governments could
maximize total output. This would imply that criminals, workers and capital owners are all treated
equally. Alternatively, governments could only care for workers — by maximizing wages —, or for
capital owners — by maximizing the return on capital. We assume that governments maximize
legal output — i.e. output minus what is appropriated by criminals — minus enforcement costs.
This is consistent with governments caring for everyone but the criminals, and with the assumption
that taxation is lump sum. Alternative objective functions as the ones mentioned above would
generate slightly diﬀerent tradeoﬀs, but the general results of the paper would qualitatively remain
the same.
The timing is as follows. First, jurisdictions simultaneously choose their level of law enforcement.
This investment is perfectly observable and is irreversible. Then, capitalists allocate their mo-
bile capital between the two jurisdictions. Investments in capital are perfectly observable and
5irreversible. The residents of each jurisdiction then make their occupational choice (worker or
criminal). Finally, production takes place, theft takes place, and payments are awarded. The
model is solved using backward induction.
3. Private Sector Behaviour
3.1 Occupational Choice
We solve for the occupational choice equilibrium of the residents of Jurisdiction i for given levels
of enforcement di and capital Ki = Ki
o + Ki
m. Since agents choose the activity that generates
the largest payoﬀ, the equilibrium number of workers in Jurisdiction i, say Li(Ki,di), will be that
which equates the return of the two occupations. Thus, Li(Ki,di) solves the following equation:
FL(Li,Ki) = α(di)KiFK(Li,Ki). (1)
In other words, the number of workers must adjust so that the return to working, the wage,
which is simply the marginal product of labour FL(·), is equal to the return to criminal activity,
αKFK(·). When FL(0,K) > αKFK(0,K), some individuals become workers (L > 0). Similarly,
FL(1,K) < αKFK(1,K) is required for some individuals to become criminals (L < 1). We assume
that both conditions are satisﬁed for the relevant range of K. Given these two conditions, and
given that the left hand side of equation (1) is monotonically decreasing, while the right hand side
is monotonically increasing with L, the solution to equation (1) is unique and denoted Li(Ki,di).
On one hand, an increase in Ki generates an increase in the wage a worker receives, provided that
FLK(·) > 0. On the other hand, an increase in Ki translates into an increase in KiFi
K, the total
return on capital.7 Since the return to criminal activity is a proportion of this total return, an
increase in Ki also leads to an increase in the return to criminal activity. The relative size of each
eﬀect determines whether an increase in Ki leads to more workers or to more criminals. To see
this, note that from equation (1), we have:




FLK(Li,Ki) − α(di)[FK(Li,Ki) + KiFKK(Li,Ki)]
α(di)KiFLK(Li,Ki) − FLL(Li,Ki)
(2)
The denominator of this last expression is positive, while the sign of its numerator is ambiguous.
Thus, the impact of a change in the capital stock K on equilibrium employment L depends on
the sign of FLK − α[FK + KFKK]. This implies that when FLK > (resp. <) α[FK + KFKK],
then labour (resp. criminality) increases when capital increases. The incentive for a resident to
participate in the legal sector increases only if the increase in wages due to additional capital is
large enough. Note that for the particular case of FLK(·) = 0, an increase in capital leads to an
increase in criminal activity for the recipient jurisdiction. An increase in law enforcement eﬀort
di unambiguously reduces the incentive to become a criminal, and consequently increases labour
supply, i.e. ∂Li(Ki,di)/∂di > 0.
Consider now the following condition:
Condition I: FLK(Li,Ki) ≥ ¯ α[FK(Li,Ki) + KiFKK(Li,Ki)], ∀ Ki ∈ [Ki
o,Ki
o + ¯ K] and ∀
Li ∈ [0,1].
Condition I guarantees that ∂Li(Ki,di)/∂Ki ≥ 0. Intuitively, Condition I requires that the in-
crease in wages following the arrival of new capital dominates the increase in the return on criminal
activities. A natural exercise would be to use the standard Cobb-Douglas production function to
elaborate on Condition I. Unfortunately, since a Cobb-Douglas production function entails the
ratio FL/KFK being independent of K, it follows that Li is also independent of Ki. However,
we can show than Condition I is always satisﬁed for several alternative production functions, for
example F(L,K) = LKµ − L2/2.8 We now turn to the characterization of the capital location
choice, with particular attention paid to potential agglomeration eﬀects.
3.2 Capital Location Choice and Agglomeration Effects
The capitalists allocate their ¯ K units of capital between the two jurisdictions. Denoted by ρi is the
per unit return on capital invested in Jurisdiction i. Since a proportion α(di) of the total return
8 With this production function, Ki
o > 1 is required to guarantee a positive marginal return on labour.
7on capital is stolen by each criminal, we have that ρi = [1 − α(di)Ci(Ki,di)]FK[Li(Ki,di),Ki].
In a standard model of capital location with no crime, the per unit return on capital in a given
jurisdiction decreases with the investment, because the marginal product of capital is itself a
decreasing function of capital. Moreover, if both jurisdictions diﬀer only in terms of their initial
stock of capital, the jurisdiction with less capital will initially attract more mobile capital. In fact,
provided there is enough mobile capital, and technologies are identical, marginal products and
capital stocks will be equalized in the two jurisdictions. No agglomeration occurs in such a case.
In the literature, agglomeration eﬀects are sometimes introduced directly by assuming that the
technology exhibits increasing returns in capital, as in Boadway et al. (2004). Alternatively,
agglomeration eﬀects are introduced indirectly by assuming the presence of an externality, as
in Glaeser et al. (1992), in which agglomeration in cities is the consequence of a transfer of
knowledge externality. In the current framework, the return to capital in the two jurisdictions
will diﬀer because enforcement may diﬀer between the two jurisdictions. More importantly, it will
also diﬀer because the number of criminals will vary relatively to the size of the investment in
capital. Consider ﬁrst the diﬀerence in enforcement between jurisdictions. Enforcement is good for
capitalists because it reduces the amount of the return on capital that is stolen by criminals, and it
is also good because it deters individuals from becoming criminals. Ceteris paribus, a jurisdiction
with more enforcement will attract more capital. Consequently, two jurisdictions could end up
with diﬀerent levels of capital simply because of diﬀerences in their choice of enforcement. Of
course, despite diﬀerences in capital allocation, no agglomeration eﬀect is at work here. If da > db,
Jurisdiction a will attract more capital, but capital will still be allocated to the point where the
per unit return in one jurisdiction is equal to the per unit return in the other jurisdiction, provided
the marginal return on capital is decreasing in capital.
The eﬀect of the stock of capital on the per unit return on capital in a given jurisdiction is much











8The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (3) shows that when Ki changes, the number of
criminals changes; this change in the number of criminals will aﬀect the proportion of the total
return of capital that is stolen. The second term represents the more traditional impact of a change
in Ki on the per unit return, but with one diﬀerence. When capital in Jurisdiction i increases,
the marginal return on capital decreases; this is captured by FKK(·) < 0. However, when capital
increases, the number of workers also changes, and so does the marginal return of capital through
the cross eﬀect FLK(·)∂Li(·)/∂Ki. Consequently, when more capital leads to more workers, the
per unit return on capital invested in Jurisdiction i may be an increasing function of the stock
of capital invested in i. Intuitively, because the labour supply and the crime rate both depend
on the amount of capital located in a jurisdiction, it is possible for the per unit return on capital
to increase when capital investment increases. More workers increases the marginal product of
capital. Furthermore, when the number of workers increases, the number of criminals is reduced
and this also leads to an increase in the total return on capital.
Below, we show that the sign of ∂ρi/∂Ki is a key determinant of the equilibrium allocation of
capital. We focus on two simple cases: (a) ∂ρi/∂Ki < 0 ∀Ki; and (b) ∂ρi/∂Ki > 0 ∀Ki. We
also brieﬂy discuss the case in which the sign of ∂ρi/∂Ki varies with Ki. It should be obvious that
when Condition I is not satisﬁed, the per unit return on capital decreases with the stock of capital.
Denoted by K(da,db) is the equilibrium capital investment in Jurisdiction a, the equilibrium capital
investment in Jurisdiction b is then given by ¯ K − K(da,db).
Proposition 1: Suppose Condition I is not satisﬁed, implying that ∂Li(Ki,di)/∂Ki ≤ 0 and
∂ρi/∂Ki < 0 ∀ Ki ∈ [Ki
o,Ki
o + ¯ K]. Equilibrium capital investments K(da,db) in Jurisdiction
a and ¯ K − K(da,db) in Jurisdiction b are then the solution to:
[1 − α(da)Ca(da)]FK[La(da),Ka
o + K(da,db)] (4)
= [1 − α(db)Cb(db)]FK[Lb(db),Kb
o + ¯ K − K(da,db)]
In such a case, K(da,db) is an increasing function of da and a decreasing function of db.
Proposition 1 is easily understood by an examination of Figure 1. Capital owners prefer to invest
in the jurisdiction in which the per unit return on capital is the highest. The more capital owners
9invest in a given jurisdiction, the lower the per unit return on capital is. In equilibrium, capitalists
allocate their capital so that the per unit return in both jurisdictions is equalized. Note that
for a given level of enforcement chosen by the other jurisdiction, an increase in enforcement by a
jurisdiction leads to an increase in capital invested on its territory. Consequently, both jurisdictions
will compete to attract capital investment by oﬀering a secure environment to the capitalists. Thus,
this environment entailsno agglomerationeﬀects; it followsthat Condition I is a necessary condition
for the presence of agglomeration eﬀects.
Furthermore, Condition I (i.e. labor supply being increasing in capital), is not a suﬃcient condition
for the presence of increasing returns to investment. What is in fact required is that labour supply
increases at a high enough rate. The following condition, Condition II, is the suﬃcient condition
for the per unit return on capital to be increasing with the stock of capital:9
Condition II: FKL(Li,Ki)[FKL(Li,Ki) − ¯ αFK(Li,Ki)] > FLL(Li,Ki)FKK(Li,Ki) ∀ Ki ∈
[Ki
o,Ki
o + ¯ K] and ∀ Li ∈ [0,1].
As we intuitively already know, for Condition II to be satisﬁed, Condition I itself has to be satisﬁed.
Further, for the per unit return on capital to be increasing with capital, labour must grow fast
enough so that both the eﬀects of a reduction in the number of criminals and the increase in the
marginal product of capital out of complementarity are large enough. For those eﬀects to be large,
labour supply needs to be responsive enough to changes in capital, which is obtained when FLK is
large enough. Going back to the example presented before, Condition II will be satisﬁed whenever
(1 − ¯ α)Kµ
o > (1 − µ)/µ. Thus, the initial capital stock and/or the capital productivity parameter
µ needs to be large enough so that wages increase fast enough with the addition of new capital.
Also ¯ α needs to be low enough so that the beneﬁt of becoming a criminal is not too high. When
both of these conditions are simultaneously satisﬁed, labour, and more importantly, criminality,
becomes very responsive to the addition of new capital. Note that if ∂Li/∂Ki > 0, but FLK is not
large enough to ensure that ∂ρi/∂Ki > 0 — i.e. Condition II is not satisﬁed — then the resulting
equilibrium will be similar to that described in Proposition 1. To summarize, under Conditions II,
the per unit rate of return on capital is increasing in capital: ∂ρi/∂Ki > 0. Proposition 2, which
9 The derivation of Condition II can be found in the Appendix.
10we now introduce, deals with the possibility of increasing return on capital or agglomeration eﬀects
and describes an equilibrium in which all mobile capital is invested in a single jurisdiction.
Proposition 2: When Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, there exists at least one equilibrium in
which all mobile capital is invested in one jurisdiction.
If the unit return ρi is an increasing function of capital for all levels of investment, then capitalists
beneﬁt from concentrating their capital in a single jurisdiction.
Which jurisdiction will obtain all the mobile capital in an equilibrium ` a la Proposition 2? Un-
fortunately, the answer is neither simple nor unique. Two types of problems arise. The ﬁrst
one is a coordination problem. Because there are a large number of capitalists who choose to
invest their capital simultaneously, it is possible that they coordinate on the “wrong” jurisdiction,
i.e. a jurisdiction in which total payoﬀ is not maximized. For obvious reasons, we focus on the
“right” equilibrium, that in which capitalists coordinate on the jurisdiction in which total payoﬀ
is maximized. Note that we could have ensured that the payoﬀ maximizing jurisdiction is chosen
by assuming a unique mobile capital owner or, alternatively, by maintaining the large number of
capital owners assumption, but with the choice of location being made sequentially. The second
problem is to identify the jurisdiction which is the most attractive for capital owners. As was dis-
cussed, both the enforcement eﬀort and the initial capital inﬂuence the per unit return on capital.
Enforcement eﬀort has a positive eﬀect on the per unit return on capital, and so does the initial
capital stock when Condition II is satisﬁed. Consequently, we can derive the following result.
Corollary 1: Suppose the two jurisdictions have the same initial endowment in capital (Ka
o = Kb
o).
As established in Proposition 2, there is then an equilibrium in which all mobile capital is invested
in Jurisdiction a (K(da,db) = ¯ K) if da > db, or one in which all mobile capital is invested in
Jurisdiction b ( ¯ K − K(da,db) = ¯ K) if da < db. If da = db, then K(da,db) = ¯ K with probability
p, and K(da,db) = 0 with probability (1 − p) is an equilibrium allocation for any p ∈ [0,1]; we
arbitrarily assume that in such a case, p = 1/2.
As can be seen in Figure 2, given equal initial capital, if the level of enforcement is larger in Juris-
diction a, then mobile capitalists prefer to concentrate their capital in that particular jurisdiction.
11Naturally, all the capital is invested in Jurisdiction b if da < db. If both jurisdictions provide the
same level of enforcement, the capitalists are indiﬀerent between concentrating all their capital in
one or the other jurisdiction. Again, to simplify, we assume that all capital owners pick Jurisdiction
a with probability p.
We now know that a jurisdiction is more attractive for mobile capital when it exerts more eﬀort
in enforcement. However, initial capital endowment also plays a role in determining where mobile
capital will locate.
Corollary 2: Suppose the two jurisdictions have chosen to exert the same level of enforcement
eﬀort (da = db). As established in Proposition 2, there is then an equilibrium in which all mobile
capital is invested in Jurisdiction a (K(da,db) = ¯ K) if Ka
o > Kb
o, or one in which all mobile capital




o, then K(da,db) = ¯ K
with probability p, and K(da,db) = 0 with probability (1 − p) is an equilibrium allocation for any
p ∈ [0,1]; we arbitrarily assume that in such a case, p = 1/2.
Abstracting from possible diﬀerences in enforcement levels, the jurisdiction with more initial capital
will attract all mobile capital. This is simply because the per unit return of capital is larger in
the jurisdiction with more initial capital. In such an environment, agglomeration eﬀects are at
work. Not only does all mobile capital locate in the same jurisdiction, but it also does so in the
jurisdiction which has the largest initial capital stock.
Note that the locational choice of mobile capital in the case in which a given jurisdiction has
both more initial capital and exerts more enforcement eﬀort is obvious, while that in which one
jurisdiction dominates in one aspect and not in the other is more complicated. Nevertheless,
agglomeration eﬀects are still at work.
Propositions 1 and 2 deal with two simple cases in which the per unit return on capital investment is
monotonically decreasing or increasing in capital. The resulting equilibria are either take the form
of an interior solution in which some capital is invested in both jurisdictions, or a corner solution
in which all the capital locates in a single jurisdiction. In fact, these two types of equilibria could
also be obtained in other circumstances. For example, the per unit return on capital could be a
12U-shaped, non-monotonic function of capital as in Figure 3. In the particular case of Figure 3, the
capitalists will obviously ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest all their capital in a. On the other hand, in
Figure 4, where the per unit return on capital has an inverted U-shape, some mobile capital will be
located in the two jurisdictions. While all those situations are interesting, the rest of the analysis
will focus on the case where the per unit return of capital is a monotonic function of capital.
4. Enforcement Policies and Capital Allocation
We now examine the simultaneous choice of law enforcement by the two jurisdictions. Both ju-
risdictions are assumed to maximize legal output (i.e. output minus what is appropriated by
criminals) minus enforcement costs. Such an objective implicitly assumes that lump sum taxation




˜ Fa(da,db) − [1 − α(da)(1 − La(da,db))]K(da,db) ˜ Fa
K(da,db) − da (5)
where La(da,db) = La[K(da,db),da], and where ˜ Fa
` (da,db) = F`[La(da,db),Ka(da,db)] for ` ∈
{∅,L,K,LK,KK}. Similarly, the problem of Jurisdiction b is given by:
max
db
˜ Fb(da,db) − [1 − α(db)(1 − Lb(da,db))]( ¯ K − K(da,db)) ˜ Fb
K(da,db)] − db (6)
where Lb(da,db) = Lb[ ¯ K − K(da,db),db], and where ˜ Fb
` (da,db) = F`[Lb(da,db), ¯ K − K(da,db)] for
` ∈ {∅,L,K,LK,KK}.
The resulting Nash equilibrium outcomes are strikingly diﬀerent depending on whether Conditions
I and II apply.
When Conditions I and II are not satisﬁed, the per unit return on capital is decreasing in capital,
agglomeration eﬀects are not present, and capital is allocated to the point where its per unit re-
turn is equalized in all jurisdictions, as stated in Proposition 1. This corresponds to the situation
13described in Marceau (1997) in which each jurisdiction ineﬃciently exerts too much eﬀort in en-
forcement. Such a result is reminiscent of those obtained in the literature on policy competition
between governments.10 By increasing enforcement, a region attracts some capital, but it imposes
a negative externality on the other jurisdiction which loses some capital. Using the terminology of
Eaton and Eswaran (2002) and Eaton (2004), the actions of the regions are then plain substitutes.
In such a case, both jurisdictions will choose a level of enforcement larger than the eﬃcient level
(i.e. too much investment compare to what a central authority would select if it maximized the
sum of both objective functions). Note that because enforcement is ineﬃcient, so is occupational
choices: in other words there are too few criminals in this world. Note however that the allocation
of capital is eﬃcient.11
When Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, all mobile capital locates in a single jurisdiction. In such
an environment, the nature of the game between the jurisdictions is very diﬀerent. For immediate
purposes, denote by Ω[Ki,di] the value of a jurisdiction’s objective function for a pair (Ki,di).
As was explained in last section, diﬀerences in the initial endowment of capital complicate the
analysis, but the forces at work remain the same, with or without these diﬀerences. Consequently,
to focus on the mechanics of competition in enforcement between both jurisdictions, we assume
from now on that both jurisdictions have the same initial capital stock. This assumption also has
the advantage of allowing us to explain why two jurisdictions with identical initial conditions can
evolve in drastically diﬀerent directions. Also, from now on, and since the problem has been made
symmetric, we simplify notation by dropping superscript i ∈ {a,b} whenever possible.
Deﬁne Ω[K,d] = [1 −α(d)(1 − L(K,d))][F(L(K,d),K)− KFK(L(K,d),K)]− d as the payoﬀ of a
jurisdiction when K units of capital locate on its territory and when it invests d in enforcement.
Let d∗( ¯ K) denote the level of enforcement chosen by a jurisdiction when all mobile capital locates
on its territory (K = Ko + ¯ K): d∗( ¯ K) = argmaxd Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d]. Note that we assume an interior
solution (d∗( ¯ K) > 0). Similarly, d∗(0) is deﬁned as the level of enforcement chosen by a jurisdiction
when no capital is located on its territory (K = Ko+0): d∗(0) = argmaxd Ω[Ko+0,d]. Notice that
when Condition I is satisﬁed and for similar levels of enforcement, the jurisdiction that attracts no
10 See, for example, Mintz et Tulkens (1986), Wildasin (1988), Wilson (1986, 1999), or Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986).
11 This would not hold if the supply of capital was elastic.
14new capital ends up with more criminals. Obviously, a jurisdiction is better oﬀ when it receives
all mobile capital, so Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d∗( ¯ K)] > Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)]. Also, let ˆ d be the level of enforcement
solving Ω[Ko + ¯ K, ˆ d] = Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)]. Clearly, it must be that ˆ d > d∗( ¯ K) > d∗(0).
Note that the following chain of inequalities must hold:
Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d∗( ¯ K)] > Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)] = Ω[Ko + ¯ K, ˆ d] > Ω[Ko + 0,d] ∀d 6= d∗(0),d > 0
Figure 5 depicts the payoﬀs of the jurisdictions in this law enforcement game. Recall that when
∂ρi/∂Ki > 0 and Ka
o = Kb
o = Ko, the equilibrium we focus on entails that all mobile capital
locates in Jurisdiction i if di > dj. If di = dj, then all the capital locates in Jurisdiction i with
probability 1/2, and in Jurisdiction j with probability 1/2. For the game considered, a strategy for
a jurisdiction is simply a level of enforcement d, and the strategy sets are the positive real numbers
(d ∈ [0,∞]). A strategy proﬁle is a pair (da,db) consisting of a strategy for each jurisdiction.
We now present three useful lemmas.
Lemma 1: When Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, the jurisdictions never choose a strategy d > ˆ d.
A jurisdiction will have no desire to invest more than ˆ d because attracting all mobile capital with
d > ˆ d makes it worse oﬀ than investing nothing and having no capital.
Lemma 2: When Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, the jurisdictions never choose a strategy
d < d∗(0).
A jurisdiction will have no desire to invest less than d∗(0) because welfare is strictly increasing in
d for d < d∗(0) and K ∈ {Ko + 0,Ko + ¯ K}.
Lemma 3: When Conditions I and II are satisﬁed,, the game has no pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
There is no pure strategy equilibrium because if Jurisdiction i chooses an enforcement level di < ˆ d,
then Jurisdiction j will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to attract all mobile capital by choosing dj such that
15di < dj < ˆ d. As for (di = d∗(0),dj = ˆ d), it is not an equilibrium because dj = ˆ d is not a best
response to di = d∗(0).
The main result of this section is as follows:12
Proposition: 3 When Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, and when the two jurisdictions have the
same endowment of immobile capital, the enforcement policy game has a symmetric mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium in which the two jurisdictions play d ∈ [d∗(0), ˆ d] according to the continuous
cumulative function H(d) and density function h(d) = H0(d) on [d∗(0), ˆ d]. For d ∈ [d∗(0), ˆ d], the
mixed strategy H(d) is given by:
H(d) =
Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)] − Ω[Ko + 0,d]
Ω[ko + ¯ K,d] − Ω[Ko + 0,d]
In this equilibrium, the expected payoﬀ of the two jurisdictions is Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)].
Note that given H(d), we have that H(d∗(0)) = 0, 0 < H(d) < 1 for d ∈]d∗(0), ˆ d[, and H(ˆ d) = 1.
The equilibrium described here is such that in expected terms, the two jurisdictions obtain a net
surplus of zero. The intuition is simple. Suppose all mobile capital is invested in Jurisdiction i
which has chosen di > dj = d∗(0) and that Ωi[Ko+ ¯ K,di] > Ωj[Ko+0,d∗(0)]. Clearly, since the two
jurisdictions are otherwise identical, this situation cannot be an equilibrium because Jurisdiction j
has an incentive to deviate to a level of enforcement ˘ dj = di+￿, with ￿ small. Indeed, if Jurisdiction
j does deviate to ˘ dj, the capitalists will re-locate all their capital from i to j, and Jurisdiction j
will now get a payoﬀ of Ωj[Ko + ¯ K, ˘ dj] > Ωj[Ko + 0,d∗(0)]. Such an incentive to deviate will be
present as long as a jurisdiction has a positive net payoﬀ. Therefore, in equilibrium, it must be
that both jurisdictions obtain a net surplus of zero in expected terms.
The mixed strategy equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is ineﬃcient unless di = d∗(Ko + 0)
and dj = d∗(Ko + ¯ K) are drawn, an event which occurs with probability zero. The equilib-
rium is ineﬃcient for several reasons. First, the jurisdiction which obtains no new mobile capital
spends d > d∗(Ko +0) on enforcement with probability approaching one (an obvious case of over–
deterrence). Second, the jurisdiction which obtains all mobile capital spends too little or too much
12 Note that the equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is reminiscent of the equilibria characterized in
Levitan and Shubik (1972), Varian (1980), or Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
16in enforcement (d 6= d∗(Ko + ¯ K)). Finally, because enforcement is ineﬃcient, occupational choice
is distorted. Note however that all capital locates in a single jurisdiction, which is eﬃcient.
Consider the ex post implications of such an equilibrium. First, note that all mobile capital locates
in the jurisdiction which oﬀers the highest level of protection. This jurisdiction will beneﬁt from
a level of welfare larger than that it would get in the no capital / low enforcement situation
(Ω[K0 + 0,d∗(0)]). In this jurisdiction, the proportion of criminals is low because there is a lot
of capital. Moreover, since enforcement is larger, the proportion of capital that is stolen is lower.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction which receives no new mobile capital obtains a level of welfare
lower than that it would get in the no capital / low enforcement situation — because the marginal
beneﬁt of enforcement eﬀort is lower than its cost, i.e. d > d∗(0). Note that since there is no
mobile capital in this jurisdiction, wages are lower. Consequently, more of its residents choose to
become criminals. To summarize, the ex post realization of the symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium entails a jurisdiction who receives all mobile capital, experiences relatively moderate
crime rate and relatively large output and wages. The other jurisdiction receives no new mobile
capital, experiences a high crime rate and very low output and wages. The simple model presented
in this paper can therefore explain how two ex ante identical jurisdictions can experience drastically
diﬀerent evolutions.
5. Conclusion
This paper has shown that in an economy with occupational choice and with jurisdictions competing
in enforcement to attract mobile capital, the symmetric Nash equilibria result in an even or an
uneven distribution of crime and capital across space. These equilibria are always ineﬃcient.
The creation of a central organization to coordinate law enforcement policies would likely be
beneﬁcial in such a context, depending on the constraints it faces and the strengths and weaknesses
of centralization. For example, a central organization may be forced, by political constraints, to
select a uniform level of enforcement in all jurisdictions. Also, it could be that a central agency
is not as eﬃcient at identifying criminals. To analyze the opportunity of creating such a central
agency, our model would have to be extended to take these factors into account.
17The current analysis assumes that labour is immobile. In our model, the prospects for individual
residing in a jurisdiction with a low level of capital are not very attractive ones: in individuals can
either obtain a relatively low wage or become a criminal. This can be partly justiﬁed if one considers
jurisdictions as being inhabited by very diﬀerent individuals, say low-skilled workers in one and
high-skilled workers in the other, with segregated labour markets. With housing prices in the
jurisdiction of high-skilled individuals that are simply not aﬀordable for the low-skilled individuals
for example. Nevertheless, if individuals were identical and labour was mobile, individuals would
be able to move to a region in which the labour market is more attractive than in their own. This
would open a whole new set of possibilities. That our results would hold in such a context is not
obvious. This is clearly the next step in our research.
In the future, we would also like to study the political economy rationale for the observed fre-
quent arrangements in which crime enforcement falls into the hands of local authorities. To our
knowledge, why this is so has not been satisfactorily answered. Certainly, the phenomena we have
described in the current analysis is likely to be taken into consideration by voters, lobby groups,
and politicians, and they should therefore be explicitly incorporated into a political economy model
of the appropriate degree of centralization of the ﬁght on crime.
186. Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: When ∂Li(Ki,di)/∂Ki = 0, i = a,b, it follows from equation (3) that
∂ρi/∂Ki < 0, i = a,b. In such a case, mobile capital is allocated between the two jurisdictions
until the per unit return is equalized. Consequently, K(da,db) satisﬁes equation (4), which simply
states that ρa[Ka
o + K(da,db)] = ρb[Kb
o + ¯ K − K(da,db)]. Diﬀerentiating equation (4) yields that:
∂K(da,db)
∂da =
α0(da)CaFK(·) − [α(da)FK(·) + (1 − α(da)Ca)FLK(·)]∂La/∂da
[1 − α(da)Ca]FKK(La,Ka




−α0(db)CbFK(·) + [α(db)FK(·) + (1 − α(db)Cb)FLK(·)]∂Lb/∂db
[1 − α(da)Ca]FKK(Lb,Ka
o + Ka) + [1 − α(db)Cb]FKK(Lb,Kb
o + Kb)
The denominator of these two expressions is clearly negative. Consequently, ∂K(da,db)/∂da is
positive since its numerator is negative, and ∂K(da,db)/∂db is negative since its numerator is
positive.
Similarly, when ∂Li(Ki,di)/∂Ki < 0, i = a,b, it follows from equation (3) that ∂ρi/∂Ki < 0,
i = a,b. In such a case, mobile capital is allocated between the two jurisdictions until the per
unit return is equalized. Consequently, K(da,db) satisﬁes equation (4), which simply states that
ρa[Ka
o + K(da,db)] = ρb[Kb
o + ¯ K − K(da,db)]. Totally diﬀerentiating equation (4) yields that:
∂K(da,db)
∂da =









∆ =α(da)FK(·)(∂La(·)/∂Ka) + [1 − α(da)Ca(·)][FKK(·) + FKL(·)(∂La(·)/∂Ka)]+
α(db)FK(·)(∂Lb(·)/∂Kb) + [1 − α(db)Cb][FKK(·) + FKL(·)(∂Lb(·)/∂Kb)].
The denominator of these two expressions is clearly negative. Consequently, ∂K(da,db)/∂da is
positive since its numerator is negative, and ∂K(da,db)/∂db is negative since its numerator is
positive.
Derivation of Condition II: For ∂ρi/∂Ki > 0, the following must be satisﬁed:
19αFK
∂Li














A more constraining requirement would be that ∂Li/∂Ki > −FKK/FKL. Therefore, using equa-
tion (2), we can show that ∂ρi/∂Ki > 0 as long as:
FKL[FKL − ¯ αFK] > FLLFKK.
Proof of Proposition 2: Inspection of equation (3) reveals that if Conditions I and II are both
satisﬁed, then ∂ρi/∂Ki is positive for all values of Ki. In such a case, there is an equilibrium in
which all capital locates in a single jurisdiction. Since the per unit return on capital is increasing
in capital in the two jurisdictions, ρa|(Ka=Ka




Moreover, given that all capitalists invest in the same jurisdiction, it is optimal for a given capitalist
to also invest in that jurisdiction.




o) if and only if da > db.
Consequently, there exist an equilibrium where the entire ¯ K is invested in a. Given that the per
unit return on capital is increasing in capital, this equilibrium dominates any other allocation.
When db > da, it must be that ρa|(Ka=Ka
o) < ρb|(Kb=Kb
o), therefore an equilibrium exist where the
entire ¯ K is invested in b. When da = db, then ρa|(Ka=Ka
o) = ρb|(Kb=Kb
o). The capitalists are then
indiﬀerent between investing all their capital in a or b.
Proof of Corollary 2: The proof of Corollary 2 is identical to that of Corollary 1, but with
varying K instead of varying d.
Proof of Lemma 1: Since Ω[Ko +0,d∗(0)] = Ω[Ko + ¯ K, ˆ d] > Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d] ∀d > ˆ d, a jurisdiction
is better oﬀ when it chooses d = d∗(0) and obtains no mobile capital (K = Ko) than if it chooses
a level of enforcement larger than ˆ d (d > ˆ d) and obtains all mobile capital (K = Ko + ¯ K).
Proof of Lemma 2: We know that d∗(0) is given by d∗(0) = argmaxd Ω[Ko+0,d], which implies





− α0(d)(1 − L(Ko,d))
￿
[F(L(K0,d),K)− KoFK(L(Ko,d),Ko)]
+ [1 − α(d)(1 − L(Ko,d))][FL(L(Ko,d),Ko) − KoFKL(L(Ko,d),Ko)] > 1, ∀d < d∗(0)
Consequently, a jurisdiction with no mobile capital will never choose a level of enforcement d <
d∗(0). Since d∗(Ko + ¯ K) > d∗(0), the same argument applies for a jurisdiction with all mobile
capital. Consequently, d ≥ d∗(0).
Proof of Lemma 3: We ﬁrst show that there is no symmetric (di = dj) pure strategy Nash
equilibrium and then show that there is no asymmetric (di > dj) pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
(i) There is no symmetric (di = dj) pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Consider a strategy proﬁle (d,d), with d ∈ [d∗(0), ˆ d] from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
If d < ˆ d, then the payoﬀ of each jurisdiction is Ωa = Ωb = 1
2Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d]+ 1
2Ω[Ko +0,d]. Clearly,
this cannot be an equilibrium as any jurisdiction, say a, has an incentive to deviate to da
0
= d+￿,
causing all the capital to locate in a, and ensuring itself a payoﬀ Ωa
0
= Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d + ￿] > Ωa for
￿ small enough (i.e. ￿ < ˆ d − d).
If d = ˆ d, then the payoﬀ of each jurisdiction is Ωa = Ωb = 1
2Ω[Ko + ¯ K, ˆ d]+ 1
2Ω[Ko +0, ˆ d]. Clearly,
this cannot be an equilibrium as any jurisdiction, say a, has an incentive to deviate to da0
= d∗(0),
and ensuring itself a payoﬀ Ωa0
= Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)] > Ωa.
(ii) There is no asymmetric (di > dj) pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Consider any strategy proﬁle (da,db), with da < db ≤ ˆ d from Lemma 1.
If da < db < ˆ d, then Ωa = Ω[Ko +0,da] and a has an incentive to deviate to da
0
= db +￿ to obtain
a payoﬀ of Ωa
0
= Ω[Ko + ¯ K,db + ￿] > Ωa for ￿ small enough.
If d∗(0) < da < db = ˆ d, then Ωa = Ω[Ko + 0,da] and a has an incentive to deviate to da
0
= d∗(0)
to obtain a payoﬀ of Ωa
0
= Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)] > Ωa.
If d∗(0) = da < db = ˆ d, then Ωb = Ω[Ko + ¯ K, ˆ d] and b has an incentive to deviate to db0
= d∗( ¯ K)
to obtain a payoﬀ of Ωb
0
= Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d∗( ¯ K)] > Ωb.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition: 3 We show that when j plays according to the mixed strategy H(d), i
has no incentive to deviate from H(d).
21Suppose j plays the mixed strategy H(d). Then, when i plays d0, it obtains all mobile capital
(K = ¯ K) with probability H(d0) and no capital (K = 0) with probability 1 − H(d0).
Before solving for the mixed strategies equilibrium, ﬁrst note that there are no point masses in
equilibrium. The intuition is simple: if a level of enforcement d0 was to be played with positive
probability, there would be a tie at d0 with positive probability. Imagine then that Jurisdiction j
decides to play d0 +￿ (instead of d0) with the same probability. The cost of such a deviation would
be of the order of ￿, but if the two jurisdictions were to tie, then Jurisdiction j would gain a ﬁxed
positive amount. The formal proof of this is as follows. Imagine that Jurisdiction i plays d0 with
positive probability ω, and that Jurisdiction j deviates to d0+￿ with the same positive probability.
The payoﬀ for Jurisdiction j will change by a factor of:
￿








Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d0 − ￿] −
Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d0] − Ω[Ko + 0,d0]
2
￿
The ﬁrst terms in braces represent the diﬀerence between losing with an eﬀort level d0 + ￿, and
losing with an eﬀort level d0. As for the second terms in braces, they represent the diﬀerence
between winning with an eﬀort d0 + ￿, and winning with an eﬀort level d0. It is easy to see that
the sum of these terms goes to zero when ￿ goes to zero. Now, the last terms in braces represent
the diﬀerence between winning alone with d0 +￿, and sharing the win with d0 (in expected terms).
Since the sum of these terms is strictly positive when ￿ goes to zero, it pays to deviate to d0 + ￿
when there is a probability mass at d0. This implies that H(d) cannot have a probability mass,
and because the cumulative function is continuous, cases in which the jurisdictions play di = dj (a
tie) occur with probability 0.
We now solve for H(d) knowing that it must be continuous on [d∗(0), ˆ d]. When i plays the mixed
strategy H(d), its expected payoﬀ is:
Z ˆ d
d∗(0)
[H(z)Ω(Ko + ¯ K,z) + (1 − H(z))Ω(Ko + 0,z)] dH(z)
For (H(d),H(d)) to be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, it has to be that all pure strategies
played with positive probability yield the same payoﬀ. We construct the equilibrium so that the
expected payoﬀ of the two jurisdictions is Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)]. Therefore:
H(d)Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d] + (1 − H(d))Ω[Ko + 0,d] = Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)] ∀ d ∈ [d∗(0), ˆ d]
22It follows that for d ∈ [d∗(0), ˆ d], the mixed strategy H(d) is given by:
H(d) =
Ω[Ko + 0,d∗(0)] − Ω[K0 + 0,d]
Ω[Ko + ¯ K,d] − Ω[Ko + 0,d]
When b plays the mixed strategy H(d), a has no incentive to deviate from H(d) because increasing
the probability of playing any d ∈ [d∗(0), ˆ d] would not aﬀect its payoﬀ as all pure strategies are
equivalent by construction.
This completes the proof.
237. Appendix II: Figures
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Figure 1
Case with ∂ρi/∂Ki < 0 and da = db
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